

Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Strategies up to the Declaration of Independence (1945-60)

John Milios and Tasos Kyprianidis

ABSTRACT

The long-standing strategy of the Greek state in the 20th century for annexation of Cyprus failed because it conflicted with the strategy of the Greek-Cypriot political power structure under Makarios, which after 1957 aimed at establishing a quasi-bicommunal Cypriot state, which in essence was to become a second Greek state where Turkish-Cypriots would be integrated as a 'minority'.

Key words: *Enosis, Cyprus conflict, Turkey, Greece, Zurich and London Agreements*

1. Introduction

Our aim is to conduct a detailed analysis of the political power balance and the strategies of the leading political Greek-Cypriot groups in Cyprus, but also the political strategy of the Greek state, in the period preceding the agreements of Zurich and London, the founding documents of the Republic of Cyprus.

Our conclusion is that the establishment of the Cypriot state was determined primarily by the dynamic of the class and political power balance in Cyprus: the formation above all of an autochthonous Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie political power structure, and secondly the dynamic of balance of forces at the international level that shaped developments in Cyprus. The paper may contribute to recent discussions on the character of Cypriot state formations.¹

2. First phase: "Enosis",² the common strategy of Greek and the Greek Cypriot leadership (1945-1957)

2.1. The pre-history and the political context in Cyprus.

¹ Nicos Trimikliniotis and Umut Boskurt, "Rethinking Cypriot State Formations", *The Cyprus Review* (Vol. 22, No. 2, 2010), pp. 87-110.

² "Unification" (with Greece).

Cyprus was ceded to Great Britain in 1878 following an agreement with the Ottoman Empire, the island's previous rulers. In February 1915 Great Britain proposed to the Greek government that it would cede Cyprus to it (on the basis of the fact that 80% of the population of the island was Greeks) in exchange for entry of Greece into the war on the side of the Entente.³ The proposal came to nothing because both the internal balance of forces inside Greece and the vicissitudes of war in the Balkans precluded participation by Greece in the Great War until 27/6/1917.⁴

From the very first day of British sovereign rule, the Greek Cypriots had their own system of political representation and their own representative (the religious political "Ethnarchy") to counterpose to the rulers, a system which emerged out of the evolution of the Ottoman Empire's political system of Asiatic despotism⁵ and involved recognition of the religious leader, the Archbishop of Cyprus, as political representative of the Greek Cypriots.

The British governed Cyprus through a system of "joint administration" based on two councils (the "Legislature" and the "Executive"). After 1925 there were 12 elected Greeks, 3 elected Turks and 9 Britons (the so-called "official members") in the Legislature. The system was supplemented by yet another "democratic institution": free elections at the municipal level, which made it possible for Greek Cypriot mayors to be elected in almost all of the island's municipalities and communes. Finally, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots participated in the Cypriot police and administration.

The economic and social development that took place in Cyprus as the 20th century progressed had the effect of bringing into existence New Greek Cypriot political and social movements above and beyond the "Ethnarchy". The most important of these organizations was the Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK), which was founded on 15th August 1926 in Limassol.⁶ In 1941 the KKK established the Progressive Party for the Working People (AKEL) to function as a broader legal progressive-leftist party. But in 1944 the KKK proceeded to close itself down as an autonomously functioning organization, merging completely with AKEL.

³ AKEL (1952): "The Road To Freedom – A Minimum Programme of AKEL, for Establishment of a United Front in the Liberation Struggle" in L.T., AKEL, Psyroukis Nicos, *Three Texts on Cyprus*, Working Group Publications, Athens (in Greek), p. 42.

⁴ Jean Milios, *Kapitalistische Entwicklung, Nationalstaat und Imperialismus. Der Fall Griechenland* (Athens: Kritiki Verlag, 1988), pp. 179-188.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 116-141.

⁶ Panayiotis Mastrogiannopoulos, *Cyprus, the Socialist Prospect is the Only Way Out for The Unsolved National and Social Problem* [in Greek] (Athens: Xekinima Publications, 1981), p. 12.

With the establishment of the KKK and later AKEL (and with the development of the organized trade union movement), the "Ethnarchy" ceased to be the Greek Cypriots' only representative. It became the representative just of the conservative segment of Greek Cypriots. But the "Ethnarchy" retained its "institutional" character within the British colonial system and continued to be recognized by the British administration as "the" representative of the Greek Cypriots.

In October 1931 the Greek Cypriot population rose in rebellion with the demand for *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece. Twenty years later, an official AKEL document describes these events as follows:

"The 1931 uprising was put down and a state of terror and dictatorship was imposed on the people of Cyprus (...).The regime of absolutism, of Palmerism, that followed the events of October introduced new dictatorial laws that prohibited all political activity and organization and all political functions, abolished freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom to march, freedom to teach Greek history, raise the Greek flag, and much else".⁷

With Greece's entry into the Second World War on the side of the Allies the emergency measures in Cyprus were relaxed. In 1943 the leadership of AKEL and Leontios, the suffragan bishop occupying the patriarchal throne, both called upon the Greek Cypriots to enlist as volunteers in the British army. It is estimated that 25,000 to 30,000 Greek Cypriots responded to this appeal by their political leadership. Among them were eleven members of the central committee of AKEL.⁸ Moreover "in the course of the war, King George II and the Prime Minister Emmanuel Tsouderos included Cyprus in the memorandum of Greek claims they submitted to President Franklin Roosevelt in June 1942".⁹

2.2. The period of "preparation" for the enosis struggle (1945 - 1949)

The first five-year period following the end of the Second World War is of decisive importance for the shaping of the political forces but also for formation of the policy of the Greek state in relation to Cyprus.

What is particularly important to understand here is that despite the fact that the Greek Cypriot political scene was divided into two political camps, left and right, even despite the fact that inside these camps (and particularly on the right) a number of different, and to some extent

⁷ AKEL, op.cit. in note 3, p. 35.

⁸ Mastrogiannopoulos, op.cit. in note 6, p. 20, AKEL, op.cit. in note 3, p. 36.

⁹ Nicos Kranidiotis, *Difficult Years. Cyprus 1950-1960* [in Greek] (Athens: Estia, 1981), p. 18.

contradictory, political centers and corresponding political tendencies were emerging, despite the fact finally that contradictions and sharpening divisions could be seen between the Greek Cypriot political leadership and Greek external policy, nevertheless what is involved is a uniform political strategy on the Cyprus question with which both the Greek state and the Greek Cypriot political parties were aligned: the strategy of *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece.¹⁰

With the "restoration of constitutional order" municipal and communal elections were held in Cyprus in which the candidates of "National Collaboration", supported by AKEL, were elected in the island's four big municipalities.

During the period we are examining, inside the Church (and the Right) two tendencies had emerged: a "moderate" tendency under the Metropolitan of Paphos Leontios (the suffragan bishop occupying the archiepiscopal throne) and a far right tendency around the Metropolitan of Kyrenia and the Secretary to the Metropolitan of Kyrenia Polykarpos Ioannides.

Admittedly in early 1947 a common Representation ("Embassy") was established, headed by the suffragan bishop occupying the archiepiscopal throne, who went to London to submit to the British government the demand for *enosis*.

The British government, as is well-known, did not accept the Greek-Cypriot demands and made the counterproposal of granting a "Constitution of Self-Government" under the suzerainty naturally of the British governor. The "Ethnarchy" immediately rejected this proposal, while AKEL accepted it, on the one hand because they regarded the constitutional reform as a step towards *enosis*, on the other through giving due reckoning to the political conditions prevailing at that time in Greece (physical extermination of communists, civil war).

After the death of Leontios (December 1947) the cleric elected to the archiepiscopal throne was the Metropolitan of Kyrenia, representative of the Cypriot far Right.

Following the failure of the colonial government's "constitutional reform" experiment (summer 1948) AKEL made an attempt to regain the political initiative. In March 1949 the central committee of AKEL resigned and a new leadership was elected. From that time onward AKEL would refuse all participation in the colonial governmental system, boycotting also

¹⁰ AKEL, op.cit. in note 3, pp. 39-40.

all the functions of the Ethnarchy, apart from the referendum of January 1950 (see 2.4). Notwithstanding the struggle between them for political hegemony, the two political camps continued, up until the end of the period under examination, to comprise "subjects" of the same strategy of *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece.

In May 1949 municipal and communal elections were held again. This time the Left lost the Municipality of Nicosia, but retained its position in Limassol, Famagusta and Larnaca.

During the period under examination (1945-1949) the policy of the Greek government in relation to Cyprus could be characterized as one of "wait and see" or non-involvement. The main reasons for this were the internal conjuncture in Greece (civil war) and the country's international aspirations for entry into the political and military system of the advanced capitalist countries of the West so as to be able to put forward whatever "national demands" and "objectives" it might have from a position of greater strength (e.g. 1947 *enosis* of the Dodecanese, 1950 participation of Greece in Korean War, 1952 entry of Greece into NATO).

But above and beyond these conjectural factors dictating the "wait and see" stance of the Greek state, the stance was consonant with a more permanent and more strategic political objective: to sideline Turkish Cypriot reactions and avoid involvement of Turkey in solution of the Cyprus problem. Non-involvement of Greece (and therefore also of Turkey) would make it possible for Cyprus to be an "internal affair" of the British Empire, a disagreement between Great Britain and a "Cypriot people" who were aspiring to "self-determination" (like Malta, etc). In political terms the Cypriot question would thus be a problem between the British government and the "Ethnarchy" (the representative of the "overwhelming majority of the Cypriot people", seen as a uniform collectivity). But at this point it would be appropriate to embark on a brief digression.

2.3. A necessary parenthesis: "Enosis" and the Turkish Cypriots

Despite their economic and political marginalization and notwithstanding all the somewhat lame argumentation of Greek nationalism, the Turkish Cypriots had been Turks for a long time and believed (or rather knew) that for them there would be less national oppression in a British colony than in a Greek province. The more so because they were aware that in the context of the post-War international balance of political forces they had their own "right to self-determination" as a specific national group. At the end of the Second World War, when the rapprochement between Greece, Britain and the Greek Cypriot colonial administration (e.g. enlistment of Greek Cypriot volunteers in the Allied armed forces, relaxation of emergency measures, etc.) made *enosis* seem probable, the Institution of

the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus (KATAK) was founded (in 1945). The organization was soon re-launched under the leadership of F. Kiucuk and called the "Popular National Party of Turkish Cypriots". The organization "Cyprus is Turkish" made its appearance at the same time. "Demonstrations and rallies began to be organized in the big towns of Cyprus for Turkish Cypriots to express their opposition to *enosis*. In one of these gatherings in Nicosia which took place on 28th November 1948 it was decided that a telegram should be sent to the President and Prime Minister of Turkey with the following content: '15,000 Turkish Cypriots decided unanimously to reject the Greek request for annexation of Cyprus by Greece or for autonomy. They believe that annexation or autonomy would result in the disappearance of the Turkish community'".¹¹

The Turkish Cypriots were almost 90,000 in number, comprising 18% of the population of Cyprus. As we shall see below, they rapidly oriented toward adoption of the demand for partition (dual *enosis*) of Cyprus via the "self-determination" of each nationality. When the Greek side embarked on armed struggle for *enosis* through the EOKA organization (1955), the Turkish Cypriots launched a similar armed group, the Volkan, which in 1957 was renamed to "Turkish Defense Organization" (TMT).

2.4. The escalation of the struggle under the hegemony of the "Ethnarchy" (January 1950 - October 1955)

The political balance of forces that took shape between 1950 and 1955 was decisive for the evolution of the Cyprus question.

During this period the "Ethnarchy" secured political hegemony of the Greek Cypriot political forces and functioned in close collaboration with the Greek state and its international diplomatic activity. Escalation of the diplomatic and political activities of the Greek state was a characteristic feature of this period.

The starting point for this particular phase was the referendum organized by the "Ethnarchy" on 15/1/1950 and supported by the Left. 95.7% of the adult Greek Cypriot population voted in favor of *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece.

At this moment it became abundantly clear that the strategy of "non intervention" by the Greek state had exhausted its potential. Britain's "intransigent" stance as regards the demand for *enosis* necessitated more

¹¹ Pantazis Terxelis, "The Diplomacy and Politics of the Cyprus Question", quoted in *The Cyprus Question – and the Internationalist Duties of Greek Cypriot Revolutionaries* (Nicosia: Publication of Workers' Democracy, 1988, [in Greek]), p. 41.

dynamic Greek involvement to change the balance of political forces in Cyprus.

Precisely at this moment the archiepiscopal throne in Cyprus fell vacant again with the death of Archbishop Makarios II. In the election that was then called, the opponent of the new Metropolitan of Kyrenia, who in the first phase of the electoral campaign managed again to secure the support of the far right of the "patriotic party", was the Metropolitan of Kition Makarios. The latter went on to win the election (20th October 1950). Although he did not belong to the new far-right tendency in Kyrenia, the new archbishop, Makarios III seems at that time to have been a "dyed-in-the-wool nationalist".¹² AKEL boycotted the archiepiscopal elections, characterizing them a "chauvinistic farce".

With the "mandate" of the referendum as the chief weapon in its arsenal, the Ethnarchy re-established close contact with the Greek government as well as with the Greek opposition parties with a view to establishing a common decision-making centre and joint headquarters for directing the struggle for *enosis*. Leadership was in the hands of the "Ethnarchy", both formally and actually. But its basic political and diplomatic initiatives now derived from Greek political power and diplomacy.

There were two key components to the chosen policy in the new political conjuncture: a) Internationalization of the Cyprus question, chiefly through resort to the United Nations, for the purpose of securing recognition of "the Cypriot people's right to self-determination", b) intensification of the conflict in Cyprus, including recourse to armed struggle.

a) The policy of internationalization was launched in 1953 by the Greek government under PM gen. Papagos, by submitting a petition on the Cyprus problem to the Ninth General Assembly of the United Nations (September 1954). But the General Assembly resolved to engage in "no further examination of the subject". (The next Greek petition to the 10th General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1955 was met with a similar fate).

The rationale of the United Nations' resolution not to seek application of the "principle of self-determination" in the case of Cyprus (50 votes for, 8 abstentions) was a reflection of the position that the Cypriots are not a "distinct people" but a population comprising Greeks (the majority) and Turks (the minority) and that therefore any attempted solution of the Cypriot problem should derive from a peaceful settlement between the three interested parties: Great Britain, Greece and Turkey.

¹² Kranidiotis, op.cit. in note 9, pp. 45-46.

Thus, contrary to the expectations of the Greek and Greek-Cypriot leadership, the Greek Cypriots' struggle for *enosis* did not, in this phase, obtain substantial international recognition and legitimation.

Simultaneous with international diplomatic activity on the part of Greece, mass mobilizations were stepped up in Cyprus. The "Ethnarchy" rejected every proposal by the colonial authorities that they should participate in a "constitutional system of government". Exactly the same policy, but on an organizationally autonomous basis, was pursued by AKEL. The mobilizations and strikes intensified, reaching a peak when Greece's appeal for recognition of the Cypriots' "right to self-determination" was rejected by the United Nations General Assembly.

International isolation of Greece in its demand for annexation of Cyprus, confirmed by the stance of the 9th General Assembly of the United Nations, obliged the Greek government to accept the British proposal for a three-day conference in London (Britain-Greece-Turkey) on the future of the Cyprus question. The conference ended in failure because the British proposal for granting of a "Constitution of Self-Government" in exchange for "pacification" on the island (the armed group EOKA had already commenced operations) was rejected by the Greek side. On the last day of the conference (6.9.1955), when its failure became known to the public, the well-known violent incidents targeting the Greek minority broke out in Istanbul and Izmir.¹³

b) In parallel with the policy of internationalization, Greek Cypriot and Greek policy was becoming oriented, from as early as the beginning of the period under examination, to organizing armed struggle in Cyprus as a means of forcing the British (but also the Turks) finally to accept a political settlement on the basis of "self-determination".

Only two months after the election of Makarios, in December 1950, army officer G. Grivas met in Athens with General G. Kosmas, head of the General Staff of the Greek Armed Forces and secured his consent to the launching of the armed struggle in Cyprus.¹⁴ In October 1952 Grivas arrived in Cyprus to "reconnoitre the terrain" and in March 1953 the final decision was taken for the armed struggle to commence.

¹³ Turkey maintained that the incidents had been triggered by the explosion of a bomb the preceding day in the house in Thessaloniki where Kemal Ataturk had been born. The Greek government regarded this unexpected event as "Turkish provocation".

¹⁴ Georgios Grivas (-Digenis), *Memoirs of the EOKA Struggle. 1955-1959* [in Greek] (Athens: 1961), p. 15.

The armed organization established in Cyprus by G. Grivas, EOKA, was not in any sense a "political organization" conducting guerrilla warfare. It was an irregular military organization entirely subordinated to the policies and the diplomatic initiatives and orders that came from the joint political leadership in Athens (Greek government) and Nicosia ("Ethnarchy"). Generally through the Metropolitan of Kition or his collaborator Azinas Grivas was in constant touch with the "Ethnarchy" and through the Greek ambassador in Cyprus with the Greek Foreign Ministry, but also with the Greek Prime Minister.¹⁵

The armed struggle finally got under way on 1st April 1955.

The new situation created by the launching of armed struggle by EOKA led to the collapse, as already indicated, of the post-war "Greek-Turkish friendship and collaboration", which had however already been crippled by the Greek diplomatic initiatives in 1953-54 for international recognition of the Cypriot people's "right to self determination". The appearance of EOKA was duly followed by the appearance of the Turkish Cypriot armed organization Volkan and the TMT¹⁶ but also by reorganization of the Cypriot police, with mass exit of Greek Cypriots and mass appointment of Turkish Cypriot policemen.

2.5. Plans for resolving the Cyprus question and the sharpening of conflict (October 1955 - March 1957).

The change in the balance of forces in Cyprus (but also internationally) that may be discerned in the preceding period led into a new phase of the Cyprus question, key feature of which was the elaboration by Great Britain of certain specific "plans for resolution" of the island's problems.

The negotiations with Makarios conducted by the Governor of Cyprus, Harding, which got under way in October 1955 and lasted until the beginning of March 1956, mark the beginning of the new period.

The basis for the negotiations was the British "plan for resolution" of the Cyprus problem, providing for "broad self-government" of the people of Cyprus (Harding Plan). Makarios counter-proposed a three-point plan: 1. "Recognition by the British government of the Cypriot people's right to self-

¹⁵ "The Foreign Minister Evangelos Averof corresponded (with Grivas) under the pseudonym 'Isaakios' (and sometimes 'Benefactor'), the Consul General under the pseudonym 'Glafkos', the consul Rodis Roufos under the pseudonym 'Scipio', the Consul A. Frydas with the pseudonym 'Xiros' or 'dry'. The Archbishop corresponded with Grivas under the pseudonym 'Haris'", Kranidiotis, op.cit. in note 9, p. 78.

¹⁶ Grivas, op.cit. in note 14, pp. 50-51, 91.

determination (...). 2. Following such official recognition the Archbishop would be willing to work together with the British government to elaborate a constitution for self-government (...). 3. The time for implementation of the principle of self-determination would be a subject for discussion between the British government and the representatives of the Cypriot people (...).¹⁷

In the negotiations that followed, the British positions gradually came to approximate the abovementioned plan of the Greek Cypriots.¹⁸ The positions were as follows: the British a) agree to recognize the Cypriots' right to self-determination, b) detach the non-immediate cession of that right from British and NATO interests, c) accept the formula that the agreement is to be presented as a "unilateral declaration" of the British government and not the official text of an agreement, d) accept that the time for implementation of self-determination should be contingent on securing (through implementation of self-determination) of the interests of "all sections of the community" rather than the initial "when self-government is proven to be an arrangement that can function satisfactorily", e) provide verbal guarantees that in the arrangements for self-government there will be provision for a Greek Cypriot prime minister, a Greek Cypriot ministry with participation of only one Turkish Cypriot minister. Verbal guarantees are also to be provided that there will be an amnesty for the EOKA fighters. f) The British Governor will exercise the function of "regulator of the polity", "for such time as this is considered necessary".

This framework for resolving the Cyprus problem was accepted both by the "Ethnarchy" and by the Greek government.¹⁹ But Makarios was continually demanding clarification and insisting on improvements to the text, in writing, almost all having to do with the "constitutional regime of self-government". This led finally to breakdown of the talks. There followed declarations both from the "Ethnarchy" and from the Greek government officially rejecting the Harding Plan.

The reasons for the ultimate rejection of the British proposals, despite the essential acceptance of their content by the Greek and Greek Cypriot side, are to be situated almost entirely in the internal balance of forces both in Cyprus and in Greece.

It was on the basis of two considerations that the "Ethnarchy" and Greece refused to accept the final Harding Plan:

¹⁷ Nicos Kranidiotis, *The negotiations between Makarios and Harding 1955-1956*, (Athens: Olkos editions, 1987 [in Greek]), p. 17.

¹⁸ On the Greek Cypriot side the negotiations were conducted by Makarios and N. Kranidiotis, General Secretary of the "Ethnarchy". The Greek Foreign Ministry was also extremely active behind the scenes.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 57-58, 92-94, 167-170.

a) That it was impossible *directly* to challenge British power in Cyprus.

b) This meant that the international and domestic balance of forces precluded elimination of the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish factor. Given the non-existence of a single "Cypriot people", the principle of self-determination, which was the most feasible in the context of the given power balance, would most likely be interpreted as self-determination of each nationality separately, that is to say "dual *enosis*" and partition of Cyprus.²⁰ Through a transitional phase of self-government Greek strategy therefore aimed at effecting this radical change in the strategic balance between the two communities, so that *enosis* – without any trade-offs with Turkey – would become feasible.²¹

Nevertheless, on the basis of the Harding Plan the Greek, and above all the Greek Cypriot, leadership was for the first time discussing something different from *enosis*, and even from "self-determination".

In the meantime, as negotiations continued, conflict was escalating to unprecedented levels in Cyprus. On 26th November 1955 a state of emergency was declared "on account of the tension from the terrorist violence" and AKEL and all the trade union and other mass organizations linked to it were outlawed. The Left newspapers *Neos Dimokratis* (*New Democrat*) and *Anexartitos* (*Independent*) were closed, as too was the Turkish Cypriot Left newspaper *Inkilapsi* (*Transformation*). But the mass rallies, demonstrations, clashes with the police, and the activity of EOKA, all continued.

In March 1956 Makarios, the Metropolitan of Kyrenia and the Secretary to the Metropolitan of Kyrenia Polykarpos Ioannides were arrested and exiled to the Seychelles.

²⁰ This solution was now openly supported by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. To the Greek argument that twofold self-determination was "unenforceable" because there was no territorial separation of the two nationalities, so that there would have to be population displacement, there was the Turkish counter-argument of Turkey's defense requirements.

²¹ The later Acheson Plan of 1964 was a plan for *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece. Under its terms a military base was granted to Turkey as the only concession, without ceding sovereignty but placing it on a fifty-year lease. A minority regime was provided for the Turkish Cypriots, similar to the arrangements in Western Thrace. The Acheson plan was submitted in an international political conjuncture much more favourable for Greece than the conjuncture of 1955-56. It was also formulated subsequent to the violent suppression of the Turkish Cypriot community through force of arms (the events of December 1963). Political marginalization of the Turkish Cypriots on such a scale would have been inconceivable in a "self-government" regime with a "regulatory role" assigned to the British Governor as in the Harding Plan. It is therefore the Acheson Plan and not the Harding Plan that exposes the limit of Turkish concessions and the limit of Greek gains. However, if *enosis* did not become possible this is attributable primarily to the way Greek Cypriot independence strategy was structured from 1957 onwards, something we can well imagine happening under the "Harding self-government regime" also.

It was in this climate that on 19th December 1956 the Radcliffe Plan was announced, with accompanying relaxation of the emergency measures in Cyprus. This was a draft constitution for "self-government" under which the Governor would be given increased powers. There was provision for a cabinet with six Greek ministers and only one Turk (for Turkish affairs). But the Governor nevertheless retained the decisively important power of appointing the Prime Minister. The most significant element in the British initiative was not so much the framework for "self-government" in itself as it was the now explicit clarification by the British Government that the Cypriot people's future "self-determination" would have the character of a "dual self-determination" of each nationality separately.²²

The Greek government rejected the British plan. The Cyprus question was discussed in February 1957 in the United Nations General Assembly, with Britain, Greece and Turkey reiterating their customary positions. The General Assembly adopted a resolution expressing the hope that "a peaceful, democratic and just solution" would be found and the hope "that negotiations for that purpose would be resumed and continued".²³

On 20th March 1957 the British government announced its intention to release Makarios, declaring that it was examining a new plan for resolution of the problem of Cyprus within the framework of NATO. The decision for the release of Makarios (and the Kyrenia leaders) was taken finally on 28th March 1957. The AKEL and "Ethnarchy" political prisoners being held in Cyprus were released at the same time.

But the failure of the "constitutional compromise" now made it inevitable that the balance of political forces in Cyprus would be exposed for all to see, in relation both to the British colonial power and to the Greek-Turkish conflict. It became clear that a) British domination in Cyprus would be brief in its duration and b) that irrespective of the territorial solution that would ultimately be adopted; the 90,000 Turkish Cypriots had not "agreed" to submit to the power of the Greek state. On the contrary, they had the power to demand (and to impose) their own "self-determination".

The release of Makarios and his arrival in Athens (where he was to remain until the signing of the Zurich and London treaties) inaugurated a new phase of the Cyprus question. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots in their political strategy faced the conjuncture and the political balance of forces just described. In their attempt to transform the political balance to their own advantage they were finally to adopt the solution of "independence",

²² Kranidiotis, *op.cit.* in note 9, pp. 239.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

thus seizing the political initiative. The problem was that in the final analysis they did not have a single shared strategy. For the Greek state, "independence" was nothing more than a transitional regime pending *enosis*. For the Greek Cypriot political leadership and its power-political strategies the idea of independence emerged gradually as the "ultimate desideratum", as the new strategy for acquisition of political power. Of course up until the establishment of the Cypriot state, and even after that, the divergence between the two strategies remained to some extent hidden, partly because both of them were framed in reference to the same opponents: on the one hand the British Empire (whose colonial policy was disintegrating to the advantage of American international political hegemony and the common strategy of NATO), on the other (and most importantly) the Turkish Cypriot political strategy and the Turkish international political and diplomatic presence.

3. Second phase: Independence and "independence".

The shaping of new strategic options (April 1957 - August 1960)

3.1. From the release of Makarios to the Zurich and London agreements. The transitional period (April 1957 - February 1959)

With the release of Makarios, the Leftist leaders and the cadres of the "Ethnarchy" it had now become evident that the British wanted to impose a "common consent" settlement in Cyprus which, while remaining in harmony with Western/NATO interests would nevertheless end British colonial domination over the island.

The Greek and Greek Cypriot political leadership was thus initially oriented towards a cessation of the armed struggle in exchange for resumption of the negotiations on the basis of the proposals that had been outlined in the past in the Harding Plan.

a) The negotiations were to be conducted between the British Government and the "Ethnarchy", without the participation of the Turkish Cypriots. b) There would be a demand for establishment of a transitional regime of self-government. c) "Self-determination" was to be recognized as the final solution, without its content being made explicit however, leaving the question of "self-determination" in the hands of the transitional regime of "self-government".

But as early as mid-April 1957 it became evident that the existing Greek-Turkish balance of forces both in Cyprus and internationally was not such as to make a settlement of this kind feasible. The Turkish Cypriots' demand that they too should be "self-determining" as a separate nationality from the Greek Cypriots and that there should therefore be "dual *enosis*"

was already being recognized by Great Britain and to some extent also by NATO as the only solution that could provide prospects of long-term peace on the island (given the international legal order shaped by resolution of the "Indian problem" in 1947).

In May 1957 the Greek side therefore adopted a twofold tactic of a) continuing the activity of EOKA, b) internationalizing the Cyprus question (through the UN) with parallel rejection of the NATO framework for resolution of the dispute, i.e. tripartite talks, etc. given that the NATO framework represented partition as the only viable solution.²⁴

But a potential impasse confronted this policy also, because as in 1955-56 it did not appear capable in itself of bringing about the required transformation in the relations of forces. Each of the poles among which the strategy of Athens and Nicosia was being elaborated started on its own account to seek new directions, though always within the framework of their shared strategic option: a) The Greek government tended to favor direct dialogue with Turkey, hoping in this way to sideline not only Britain but also the Turkish Cypriot political leadership, so as to achieve de facto retreat of the Turkish side from the position of "dual self-determination". b) The "Ethnarchy" attempted initially to turn EOKA chiefly against the Turkish Cypriots, seeking through large-scale massacres of the Turkish Cypriot population to weaken the resolve of their political leadership. Above and beyond the letters from Makarios to Grivas, the following letter is also entirely characteristic. It was sent to Grivas in June 1958 by the Metropolitan of Kition, key exponent of the views of Makarios in Cyprus following the exile of the Archbishop: "To avert any weakening of our position at the United Nations and avoid giving cause for closer collaboration between Britain and the Turks in Cyprus, we should confine our attacks to the Turks, indeed inflicting upon them as much damage as possible. They must be dealt with mercilessly because only in this way will they be frightened into minding their own business".²⁵

But this "Ethnarchy" policy of physical extermination of Turkish Cypriots was not to be put into practice until the establishment of the Cypriot state, because it did not meet with the approval of the Greek government. The Greek government judged that large-scale massacres of Turkish Cypriots would deprive Turkey of any ability to compromise and would lead inevitably to partition, as well as very likely triggering Turkish reprisals against the Greeks of Istanbul.

²⁴ Grivas, *op.cit.* in note 14, pp. 169-174. Kranidiotis, *op.cit.* in note 9, pp. 265-276.

²⁵ Grivas, *op.cit.* in note 14, p.276.

At the diplomatic level the "Ethnarchy" was from the beginning of the period under examination already focusing on independence as an alternative solution to the Cyprus problem in the event that "self-determination" (in its Greek interpretation, naturally) should prove unattainable. As early as 15/5/57, in an interview for an American television network, Makarios was saying that "in the course of exercising their self-determination the Cypriot people will have the option of choosing either a) *enosis* with Greece, b) the establishment of an independent state, or c) independence within the British Commonwealth".²⁶

The Greek government opted for "independence" on the calculation that it offered the best prospects as an indirect route towards *enosis*. On 25th July 1957 the Greek Consul General in Cyprus A. Vlachos sent Grivas the following information: "There are indications that the Archbishop is optimistic and that he is tending in his thinking to favor the solution of 'independence' (...) It emerges that the Turks are again opposed to any such development because they perceive that the idea of independence has gained ground and no international body would be in a position to hold back the natural evolution of independence into *enosis*".²⁷

The Greek government was holding behind-the-scenes talks with the Turkish government on the solution of independence. Turkey however rejected independence as a solution on the grounds that: "a) the independent state will sooner or later be united with Greece. b) no independence guarantee can withstand changes in international conditions (...) c) when the Cypriot state becomes independent it will be dominated by fanaticized Greek Cypriots and whatever guarantees it might give to the minority, they will not enjoy security".²⁸

In Cyprus, perceiving the great political influence exerted by AKEL in the cities, Grivas initially attempted physical extermination of the Communist leadership through assassination of cadres. When this policy was suspended following intervention by the Greek government, he reoriented towards creation of a "patriotic political party" and organization of passive resistance by the Greek Cypriot population to the British political and economic presence in Cyprus. At the same time he declared to the Greek government that he disagreed with the prospect of "independence", instead proposing the withdrawal of Greece from NATO and its entry into the non-aligned group of countries as a means of pressuring for solution of the Cyprus problem.²⁹

²⁶ Ibid., p. 179.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 191.

²⁸ Letter from Averof to Grivas, 26/8/57, in Kranidiotis, op.cit. in note 9, p. 283.

²⁹ Grivas, op.cit. in note 14, pp. 285-286.

But while passive resistance appeared to yield certain results, at least in economic terms, the organization of a political party under Grivas failed because he never obtained practical support from the "Ethnarchy" and the Greek government. The operational headquarters in Athens and Nicosia thus remained entirely united politically, whatever individual political initiatives may have been taken by each of the three poles during this period and whatever changes may have been foreshadowed from May 1957 to move official policy from "self-determination" to "independence".

But in the meantime the political initiative for resolution of the Cyprus problem remained in the hands of the British government. In January 1958 the new British governor of Cyprus, Hugh Foot, released to the public a plan for resolving the Cyprus problem which provided for a) a transitional period of self-government lasting between five and seven years, b) guarantees that at the end of this period a definitive solution would be sought that would be acceptable to both Greeks and Turks, c) immediate lifting of the emergency measures and the return of Makarios to the island, d) the commencement of negotiations with the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communities to work out a constitution for self-government (Kranidiotis 1981: 307). This plan (the Foot Plan) was rejected by the Turkish Cypriots and by Turkey, which refused any form of "self-government" under the control of the "Ethnarchy" of Makarios, insisting on the solution of partition. But a little later it became known, off the record, that Turkey was prepared to retreat from the demand for "separate self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots" (partition) if the Greeks would allow it a military base on the island. After consultation with the "Ethnarchy" the Greek government rejected this demand also.³⁰ AKEL officials also participated in discussions with the British authorities on the Foot Plan.

With both inter-communal strife and civil conflict (between Greek Cypriots) intensifying, Britain in June 1958 put forward a new plan for resolution of the Cyprus problem (the Macmillan Plan), in which dual *enosis* was clearly being projected as the final solution (linkage of Cyprus to Britain, Greece and Turkey, participation in a transitional government by representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments, dual nationality for the Cypriots – British and Greek for the Greek Cypriots, British and Turkish for the Turkish Cypriots, etc.).³¹ The Greek government immediately rejected the plan, but ordered Grivas to call a new EOKA ceasefire. He, of course, complied. Notwithstanding the Greek rejection, the British government announced its decision to implement the Macmillan Plan with all means at its disposal.

³⁰ Kranidiotis, op.cit. in note 9, pp. 308-311.

³¹ Ibid., pp.320.

Intensive diplomatic activity developed over the following months, in the framework of which the initiative for mediation by the NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak was of particular significance. This initiative in essence amounted to active American involvement in the Cyprus problem and appeared in principle to support a solution to the question more favorable for Greece than partition. Greece accepted Spaak as an intermediary, pressuring Makarios to accept also.

On the eve of Spaak's visit to Athens, where the NATO Secretary-General was to table his proposals for resolution of the Cyprus problem, Makarios in an interview with the vice-chairperson of the British Labor Party Barbara Castle came out for the first time publicly in favor of the independence solution (22/9/1958).

On 23/9/1958 Spaak in Athens put forward his proposals for resolution of the Cyprus problem. A seven-year transitional government with a Greek majority, a single parliament and two subsidiary assemblies for unequivocally communal issues, a five-member conference (Britain, Greece, Turkey, Greek Cypriot community, Turkish Cypriot community) to determine the final arrangements for the island. The Greek and Greek Cypriot side accepted the Spaak proposals, declaring support for independence as the ultimate solution. But finally Spaak's attempted mediation failed because it was rejected by Britain and Turkey.

On 27th September 1958 Makarios officially communicated the proposal for independence to the British government. From that point onward independence was to constitute the official political strategy both of the "Ethnarchy" and of the Greek government. Of course while for the Greek government it was, as indicated, a matter of political maneuvering, for "independence" as a transitional stage towards annexation of all of Cyprus within a reasonable time frame of one or two decades, for the Cypriot political leadership independence was now posed as the final goal of its constitution as political (state) power.

But what deserves to be noted here is that the new conjuncture that arose out of Britain's attempt to impose the Macmillan plan for partition: It became for the first time possible to legitimate the new political strategy of independence, both in Cyprus and in Greece. Despite the reaction both from the Kyrenia group and from AKEL (and correspondingly the opposition parties in Greece), independence no longer had the appearance of "betrayal of the struggle" but rather a "more realistic" (or at least more conciliatory) political tactic against the "impasse" of implementing the Macmillan Plan.

Now taking the political initiative, the Greek government embarked on bilateral talks with Turkey, not including Britain, on the basis of the

independence plan. The Turks initially insisted on being given a military base on the island because they considered that "whatever guarantees are given and whatever type of polity is established, Cyprus will become united with Greece at the first sign of any relaxation from Turkey, and Turkey wants at least to be certain that they will retain a base for purposes of their own security".³² They also asked that the new state be named "Greek-Turkish Republic of Cyprus". The Turks eventually abandoned these demands.

On the basis of the draft agreement between the two countries a tripartite conference (between Britain, Greece and Turkey) was held, starting on 6th February 1959, which on 11th February 1959 finalized the well-known Zurich Agreement (between Britain, Greece and Turkey). 19th February 1959 saw the signing of the London Agreement (between Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community). The Zurich and London agreements of February 1959 established the framework for the independence regime of the Republic of Cyprus.

3.2. From the Zurich and London agreements to Independence. Beginning of the parting of the ways between the two strategies (February 1959 - August 1960)

The Zurich and London agreements provided for a presidential republic with a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president, in which the Greek Cypriots would exercise executive power³³ (seven of the ten members of the Cabinet, a corresponding majority in the administration of the state and of the police, etc). The Turkish Cypriots would be provided with a number of guarantees against Greek Cypriot power (requirement for a separate Turkish Cypriot majority for draft legislation on economic matters, and for amendment of the Constitution, Turkish vice-president's right of veto on defense matters, foreign policy and public security). The Turkish Cypriots were thus acquiring a higher level of representation in the government, the parliament, public administration, the army, etc. (30%) than their demographic strength in the Cypriot population (18%). Finally Greece, Turkey and Great Britain were designated guarantor powers for the agreements, with Britain being ceded military bases under its sovereignty on the island, covering an overall area of 99 square miles.³⁴

³² Letter from Averof to Grivas, 4/2/1959, Grivas, op.cit. in note 14, p. 353.

³³ The Greek Cypriots retained the legislative power. The House of Representatives included 35 Greek Cypriot and 15 Turkish Cypriot deputies. The Turkish Cypriot Community Assembly (like the corresponding Greek Cypriot Community Assembly) had decision making power only over religious, educational, etc. questions that were the exclusive concern of Turkish Cypriots (or Greek Cypriots, respectively).

³⁴ Kranidiotis, op.cit. in note 9, pp. 373-378 and 534-556.

For the Greek state the Zurich-London agreements were the first step towards *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece. It had of course been accepted that the "final solution" to the Cypriot problem, (*enosis*) could no longer be an immediate goal, but rather a medium-term goal. *Enosis* would thus emerge out of a step-by-step smooth hellenization of the Cypriot state and the "peaceful" political, economic and cultural marginalization of the Turkish Cypriot community. As later noted by E. Averof: "With 80% of the population, 96% of the wealth, 90% of the landed property, with the mines in Greek hands, with education 90% Greek, to the extent that we had difficulty finding Turks to occupy their 30% of the civil service position, with all these elements, it was certain that in 30 years Cyprus would be more Greek than it was then".³⁵

But for the Greek Cypriot political leadership, or at least the dominant group in it, the "Ethnarchy", the independence regime was on the contrary not an intermediate goal but the final goal. The Greek Cypriot political leadership was therefore seeking immediate confrontation with the Turkish Cypriot community and a crushing political victory over the latter, so that, with parallel exploitation of the international political power balance, the international political status of an *independent Greek Cypriot Republic* might be secured. Characteristic here is the interpretation Makarios gave to the Zurich and London agreements which officially inaugurated a Greek-Turkish state in Cyprus:

"I considered myself duty-bound to sign the agreement, by means of which an end was put to British domination of Cyprus and *a little Greece was established in the Eastern Mediterranean* (...). The rights that are ceded to the Turkish minority are aimed exclusively at securing the interests of the Turkish minority (...). The guarantees concern the international relations of the Cypriot state aim at impeding for the future any relationship or alliance with states belonging to the Communist bloc. As for stationing of Greek and Turkish troops on the island, I venture to point out that such stationing is a consequence of the alliance that is being contracted between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. In the event of dissolution of this alliance, *no Greek or Turkish soldier will remain in Cyprus*". (Letter from Makarios to Grivas, 20/2/1959, our underlining).³⁶

As become evident in the following years, the strategy of the Greek Cypriot leadership was for *hellenization* of the Cypriot state, through violation and de facto abolition of the agreements on the basis of which it

³⁵ Evangelos Averof, "An understanding with the Turks is possible", Pages of Kathimerini, 17 July 1988, p. 39 (in Greek).

³⁶ Quoted in Kranidiotis, op.cit. in note 9, p. 380.

had been established (which provided for a *Greek-Turkish* state), while simultaneously retaining independence from Greece. But this combination of nationalism on the one hand and on the other spurning of the pretensions of the "national centre" for absorption into the main body of the "national state" proved to be an exceptionally inflammable political mix.

With the signing of the agreements, the political initiative passed almost entirely into the hands of the "Ethnarchy". The first problem that was posed was that of securing the unity of Greek Cypriots and their consent to the agreements, given the already formulated disagreement not only of the Kyrenia group and AKEL but also of Grivas with the "solution of independence".

The ability of the "Ethnarchy" strategy to impose its hegemony within the Greek Cypriot community was mainly the outcome of the objective balance of forces that took shape in Cyprus in the two years between 1957 and 1959. This political balance of forces and the consequent hegemony of Archbishop Makarios emerged essentially out of two elements:

a) The fact that independence was the only feasible solution for Cyprus, given that Greek Cypriots rejected the solution of dual "self-determination".

b) The fact that independence could under certain conditions comprise the stage prior to *enosis*.

This second factor indeed enabled Makarios to establish contact with basic cadres of EOKA, sidelining Grivas, initially securing the unity of the "patriotic party" while at the same time isolating the extreme right-wing faction in Kyrenia. The political strategy of Makarios thus imposed its political hegemony on Cyprus by virtue of a tactical compromise with one section of the Cypriot right that supported *enosis*: As early as March 1959 Makarios was founding a new political party (the United Democratic Front for Re-creation - EDMA) in which most of the EOKA cadres participated. On 2nd April 1959 the first provisional government was formed, including seven Greek Cypriot minister, four of whom were EOKA officials (P. Georkatzis, A. Georgiadis, T. Papadopoulos and Gl. Clerides).

The opposition (of the *enosis* supporters and Grivas) to the political leadership of Makarios was thus initially concealed and only became manifest in the summer of 1959, but again in a desultory fashion (with only a section of them withdrawing from the political party supporting Makarios). Finally the dissenting Grivas supporters, the Kyrenia activists and other nationalists supporting *enosis* came to an arrangement with Ioannis Clerides, former mayor of Nicosia, who was supported by AKEL, and on

17/1/1959 (that is to say a few weeks before the elections) they formed a political movement supporting *enosis*, the "Democratic Union of Cyprus".

On 13/12/1959 the first presidential elections were held, in which the party of Makarios secured 67.8% of the Greek Cypriot vote. Immediately afterwards AKEL withdrew its support from the pro-*enosis* "Democratic Union" and began to collaborate with Makarios. In the subsequent parliamentary elections the Makarios party secured 30 of the 35 Greek Cypriot seats and AKEL 5. The political isolation of the pro-*enosis* Cypriot right-wing was consummated. Pro-*enosis* policies could henceforth be promoted in Cyprus only from within the Makarios party and only in relation to attempted annexations of Cyprus originating in Greece.

But the essential differentiation between the strategy of Makarios and the strategy of the Greek state emerges most clearly over the question of interpreting the agreements and elaborating the new Cypriot constitution. Here, whereas the Greek side sought as much as possible to efface the separate institutional arrangements through negotiations with all parties involved (e.g. common organizational structure for the Cypriot army, not divided into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot companies, common municipal government in the big towns, etc.), Makarios preferred to institute separate arrangements *with a view to then not implementing these arrangements in practice*. In this way he sought from the outset to introduce conflict into the relations between the two communities and then, supported by the power of the Greek Cypriots, proceed to abolish the provisions in the Zurich and London agreements guaranteeing the political existence, and proper representation, of the Turkish Cypriots. The bone of contention here was primarily organization of local government in the big towns. Despite the constitutional protection extended to the separate municipalities, Makarios refused to establish them (asserting that the proposed separation must be "functional" not "territorial"), thus provoking intense reactions from the Turkish Cypriots and heightening of tensions in Greek/Turkish relations.³⁷ The prerequisites were thus created as early as 1959-60 for the intercommunal "war" that several years later culminated in ostracism of the Turkish Cypriots by the Cypriot state and confinement of the overall Turkish Cypriot population to "enclaves" whose total area did not exceed 5% of the territory of Cyprus.

Proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus took place on 15th and 16th August 1960. The evolution of the newly established state was to be determined by the political conflicts and the political balance of power that had become consolidated during the transitional period of 1959-1960, as outlined above.

³⁷ Kranidiotis, op.cit. in note 9, pp. 408, 458-61, 435.

4. "Partition" and independence: An interpretation.

The preceding analysis makes it clear that the Greek Cypriot strategy of independence for Cyprus but also the Greek strategy of "independence" (as intermediate stage prior to *enosis*) emerged as the outcome of a political balance of forces in Cyprus as well as an international balance of forces that made unconditional "*enosis*" between Cyprus and Greece impossible. On the other hand the balance of forces internally and internationally clearly rendered "dual self-determination", i.e. partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, something entirely feasible. Indeed in a subsequent phase, a few years after the establishment of the state, at the beginning of the 1960s, an evolution in the balance of forces to the advantage of Greece made *enosis* conceivable, simply in exchange for concession to Turkey of a military base, the extent of which as a proportion of the overall territory of Cyprus would have been much smaller than the proportion of Turkish Cypriots in the Cypriot population.

These solutions were rejected by the Greek state because of the categorical refusal of the Greek Cypriot political leadership to accept any territorial concession to Turkey.

The strategy of "independence" eventually adopted by the Greek state was indeed "maximalist" in the sense that as final solution it aimed at the most ambitious objective of *enosis* without offering anything of any importance to Turkey in return. But the strategy also entailed the risk of "total defeat", with all Cypriot territory remaining outside of Greek jurisdiction, as indeed occurred, after the failed Greek military intervention and the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974.

It was awareness of this risk that led the Greek political leadership to discuss the solution proposed by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community of dual *enosis*, under the precondition, of course, of minimization of Turkish demands. In October 1956 and again in June-July 1957 the Greek government sounded out the Turkish government over the possibility of partition or of *enosis* with concession to Turkey of a military base. These discussions were abandoned because of the "Ethnarchy"'s opposition to them.

At the same time the solution of partition, always counterposed to independence, was adopted by all the Greek opposition parties. To quote some extracts from parliamentary speeches of 1959 from the political leaders of the opposition:

"And we will give some thought to whether partition might not be a clearer solution and one more conducive to calm and security". (I.

Iliou, leader of the Left opposition party EDA, quoted in *The Greeks struggled...*, 1959: 36). "At most it would end up something like what happened in India, with the Indians and the Muslims of Pakistan, on a proportional basis. (...) It would not be the most unpleasant outcome if we were to lose a part of Cyprus and win at least the remaining four fifths. (...) That solution would be much preferable to definitively losing all of Cyprus". (Markezinis, leader of the Centre-Right party of "Proodeftikoi" ["Progressives"]). "Given that the Government was resolved to abandon the demand for self-determination (...), it had abundant opportunity to shoulder its responsibilities and accept the Harding-Radcliffe solutions (...) which are much more in the interests of the nation than what is being signed today". (S. Venizelos, leader of the Centre party of Fileleftheroi [the Liberals]).³⁸

It is easy to understand why the Greek political leadership, if it had not faced categorical refusal from the Greek Cypriots, would have been willing to negotiate a solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of partition. Greece would be annexing 80% of the territory of Cyprus, while at the same time the movement of the populations would eliminate the factor that had led to the sharpening of tensions between Greeks and Turks. And Cyprus, now included in the territory of Greece and Turkey, would be incorporated into NATO, thereby appeasing Western international political interests in the area.

The question thus arises of why the Greek-Cypriot political leadership rejected out of hand any idea of negotiation on the basis of "dual self-determination".

Political strategy is not the expression of the "self-consciousness" of some subjects or other (political leaders, the bourgeois class) who are aware of their "objective and long-term interests" and promote them consistently under all conditions. Political strategy emerges out of class struggle and always in accordance with the continually shifting political and class balance of forces. The preceding analysis has shown us that the Greek Cypriot political leadership was initially oriented towards *enosis*, for which it struggled, irrespective of the fact that *enosis* would eliminate the capacity of this political leadership to constitute itself as an autonomous state power and would lead to absorption of Cypriot capital by Greek capital, etc. The subjugation and absorption of individual (political, economic, ideological) interests by the overall national (bourgeois) interest is a process that can be arrested only exceptionally and under highly specific circumstances.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 24.

The Cypriot exception cannot be explained either by the existence of a Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie as such, much less to the will of the Greek Cypriot political leadership. It emerged in our opinion out of a) the historically inherited mode of political organization (the pre-existing Greek-Cypriot political "power structure") and b) the specific drift of post-War political conflict in Cyprus (the prospect of partition).

The political system in Cyprus, as developed under the rule of the Ottoman Empire and as continued in broad outline under the British colonial administration, was based on the existence of a Greek-Cypriot political "power", subordinate to the foreign overlord but nevertheless with considerable autonomy, the "Ethnarchy", whose domain included *all of Cyprus*. This Greek-Cypriot "power", as a (potential) form of Greek rule, tended on the one hand objectively to seek to join forces, or unite in *enosis* with the Greek state, on the other as an autonomous power covering all of the territory of Cyprus, to oppose any session (to Turkey and/or the Turkish Cypriot community) of any part of its dominion.

The entire Greek Cypriot "power structure" was pervaded through and through by this contradiction, as it was evident that liberation from British domination would necessitate loss of part of the territory over which it had authority. This contradiction did not concern the Greek state, whose strategy was to annex as a large a part of Cypriot territory as possible.

If the Greek state was able to bargain on the basis of the principle of partition, so as to achieve the annexation of as a large a part of Cyprus as possible, for the Greek-Cypriot "power structure" it was impossible to cede a section of *its* already existing "territory".³⁹

The contradiction under which the Greek Cypriot political leadership labored was stretched to the limit when British plans for partition were set in motion. The solution of "independence" resolved the contradiction in the sense that it averted any Greek Cypriot territorial concessions.

But when immediately afterwards the Greek Cypriot virtual power took shape as real state-political power (with the Zurich and London agreements and the declaration of independence), the ground was prepared for definitive separation of Greek-Cypriot from Greek political power.

Thus, if the period between 1957 and 1959 represents a transitional phase for the differentiation between the Greek strategy of "independence" and the Greek Cypriot strategy of independence, the period from 1959 to

³⁹ "For Makarios (...) the aim has become maintenance of the island's Hellenic character and its unity: Hellenism comes before Hellas!" Kranidiotis, op.cit. in note 9, p 49.

1960 marks the point of no return in the differentiation process between the two strategies. The evolution of the two strategies was also to set its imprint on the following period of 1960-1974. Both strategies would continue in parallel to be determined in accordance with the movement of the same internal and international contradictions.

John Milios is Professor of Political Economy and History of Economic Thought at the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA), Greece.

Tassos Kyprianidis is a free-lance writer in matters of current policies, aspects of the critique of political economy and epistemology.